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Abstract 
This article analyses Romania’s situation after the armistice of Focsani 
(signed on December 9, 1917) and at the beginning of the year 1918. It 
valorises mainly documentary evidence from both French and Romanian 
diplomatic and military archives. The necessary documentation for the 
elaboration of the article consisted mainly of telegrams and military reports. 
The most significant and important documents were selected. So the paper 
makes a critical analysis of the sources, resorting to a comparison between 
documents. The study also used a few concepts belonging to the theory of 
international relations. For a better understanding, the paper highlighted and 
analysed briefly the premise, namely the period of Romanian neutrality. The 
research paper explained as well why the Romanian Kingdom could not 
remain neutral in the First World War, why its situation in the international 
system was completely different from that of Switzerland. At the end of 1917 
and the beginning of 1918, Romania’s situation worsened very quickly due to 
the unfavourable external circumstances. Under the influence of Bolshevik 
ideology, Russian soldiers had refused to fight since the fall of 1917. The 
armistice of Brest Litovsk, signed by Soviet Russia in early December 1917 
placed Romania in a critical situation. On January 13/26th, 1918, Russia broke 
all diplomatic relations with the Romanian government from Iaşi. The 
Romanian Kingdom would be surrounded only by hostile forces. Ukraine, 
which had served as a buffer zone for the Romanian state, concluded, in turn, 
a separate peace with the Central Empires, on February 9, 1918. Although the 
Romanian army needed military aid, war material, and ammunition, and faced 
pressures of the Central Powers, the Allies asked for resistance. Among the 
four powers of the Entente, France was the most intransigent. In fact, all these 
states strongly rejected the separate peace but the French attitude was more 
clearly defined than the English attitude for instance. 
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Introduction : a few aspects concerning the sources and methodology 
This short study analyses Romania’s situation after the armistice of 
Focsani (signed on December 9, 1917) and during the first months of the year 
1918. The paper valorises mainly documentary evidence from both French and 
Romanian diplomatic and military archives. The necessary documentation for 
the elaboration of the article consisted mainly of telegrams and military 
reports. The telegrams were sent from the Romanian government to its 
plenipotentiary ministers from Paris (Victor Antonescu), London (Nicolae 
Misu) and Rome (Emil Lahovari). I also studied telegrams received by Allied 
representatives in Iasi (the count Charles-Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, Sir 
George Barclay, the baron Carlo Fasciotti, Charles Vopicka) from the allied 
authorities. From the large amounts of documents the most significant and 
important were selected. The article made a critical analysis of the sources, 
resorting to a comparison between documents. The short study used a few 
concepts belonging to the theory of international relations such as realism, 
neorealism, survival, power, national interest, alliances, etc. The paper 
attempted also to resort to an approach from the perspective of the theory of 
international relations. Thus, this scientific contribution tries to establish a sine 
qua non connection between the history and theory of international relations. 
 
Premises 
The Romanian Kingdom entered World War I in August 1916, 
following two years of neutrality or so-called armed expectation with the 
defence of the frontiers, a concept also used in historical literature and 
documents from archives. (See Iordache, 1998; Arhiva Nationala Istorica 
Centrala a Romaniei, Fund Microfilms, France, roll 101, p. I: 267). 
The Romanian neutrality could not be perpetual because Romania’s 
situation was completely different from other neutral countries in World War 
I. It could not adopt a position of permanent neutrality like Switzerland, for 
instance. The international community had unanimously recognized 
Switzerland’s perpetual neutrality, concluding the Peace Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648). Romania’s neighbouring countries were all belligerent ones. Romania 
carried out intense negotiations with both alliances, the Entente and the 
Central Powers. Finally, the government headed by Ion I. C. Bratianu decided 
to join the block that promised the achievement of Romanian national interest. 
The national interest is an essential concept for realism in international 
relations. The Romanian state performed as a rational actor acting for the 
achievement of its national interest. The Romanian authorities strove to obtain 
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the greatest advantages possible from the war with the lowest losses. (Gorun, 
2018: 226-211) 
What did national interest mean for Romania in the years of the Great 
War (at least until the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution and the collapse 
of Russian Empire)? In those difficult circumstances, national interest meant 
the union of Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina with the Old Kingdom. This 
was the main objective for Romanian foreign policy immediately after the 
outbreak of the war. Another fundamental concept in realist theory of 
international relations is power. Any state actor in the international arena 
strives to maximize its own power, its own capabilities. Realist thinkers 
stressed the great importance of military power. (Morgenthau, 2007: 202-67) 
During neutrality but also following intervention in the Great 
Conflagration, the Romanian army was poorly equipped and not very well 
trained. (Grandhomme, 2018: 52-51) The need for effective war materials, 
ammunition, and modern weapons was stringent. (Torrey, 2014: 35-29). That 
is why the Romanian government delayed the intervention into the war for so 
long. But this is just one reason for this major decision. (Gorun, 2018: 48; 
Idem, 2013: 334-323; Idem, 2007: 318-303). Romanian authorities and 
diplomacy strove to receive certain guarantees from Entente concerning the 
fulfilment of Romanian national aspirations. I share the opinion of the 
historian Gheorghe I. Bratianu, who considered that two major questions had 
been the main topics during Romania’s negotiations for the accession to the 
Entente: a question of principle concerning the territorial claims and a problem 
of opportunity, regarding the decision which had to be taken and the optimal 
moment for a military intervention. Of course, between the two issues, there 
was a relation of interdependence. (Bratianu, 1998: 260-258; Gorun, 2018: 
221). 
After the Romanian army obtained a few easy victories, the following 
defeats forced the authorities and King Ferdinand to leave Bucharest for Iași. 
A large part of the country was occupied by the Central Powers’ troops. In the 
following year, 1917, the royal army was particularly reorganized due to the 
contribution of the French Military Mission commanded by General Henri-
Mathias Berthelot. Thus, Romanian troops were able to achieve the 
outstanding victories of Marasti, Marasesti and Oituz, in the summer of 1917. 
Unfortunately, the Romanian Kingdom could not exploit these successes due 
to the unfavourable international circumstances and also because of certain 
events that had happened on the front starting earlier that spring. (Preda, 2017: 
160-129) 
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The way to peace and considerations on relations with the Allies 
Survival: the main objective 
Being under the influence of Bolshevik ideology, Russian soldiers had 
refused to fight from the beginning of the 1917 fall. They had also begun the 
retreat from Romanian front in disorder. (Service Historique de l’Armée de 
Terre, Conseil Superieur de Guerre, Carton 4N40, D. 3, Telegram no. 1077 of 
General Berthelot to the Minister of War, December 19th 1917; Cipaianu, 
1993: 61-60). Romania’s situation worsened continuously due to the armistice 
signed by Soviet Russia with the Central Empires in Brest-Litovsk, at the 
beginning of December 1917. (Torrey, 2014: 288-275). From that very 
moment, Russia ceased to be an allied power. (Gorun, 2010: 193). Russia 
became somehow even a more dangerous enemy than the Central Powers for 
the Romanian Kingdom. Russian policy was characterized by unpredictability. 
(For this issue, see also Besançon, 2013).  
The attitude of the new Bolshevik government, concerning the war in 
general- and particularly regarding Romania- was eloquent. In Vladimir Ilici 
Lenin’s opinion, World War I was an imperialist conflict. All peoples should 
have the right to self-determination and thus, the Romanian state will be 
perceived by Soviet Russia as a multi-ethnic state, a prison of the peoples. In 
fact, in the interwar period, the Russian authorities acted for the dismantling 
of the Romanian state. The incidents that took place at Tatar Bunar, in  1924, 
were significant. 
The armistice of Brest-Litovsk placed Romania in a desperate situation 
as it was going to be surrounded almost only by hostile forces. Taking into 
account these realities, Romania’s main foreign policy objective soon became 
the survival of the state. The survival concept is widely-spread in structural 
realism theorised by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Rather than John 
Mearsheimer, who proposed an offensive neorealism, according to Kenneth 
Waltz, the main concern of the states was not the maximization of their power, 
but the maintenance of their positions in the system. (Waltz, 2006:176). 
Therefore, in the opinion of the famous representative of structural realism, 
the fundamental goal of the states is the assurance of their security and 
survival. In this context, Kenneth Waltz spoke about the “self-help” principle, 
which could be linked to John Mearsheimer’s postulate. Mearsheimer wrote 
that the primordial purpose of all state actors was survival and that is why the 
states cannot trust other state actors to guarantee their national security. The 
representative of the offensive neorealism defined eloquently the alliances, 
starting from this thesis. According to him, the alliances represent: “only 
temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be 
tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance 
partner.” (Mearsheimer, 2003: 27; Idem, 1994/1995: 11). To assure their 
European Scientific Journal February 2020 edition Vol.16, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
50 
survival, the states will tend to form a balance of power. This balance 
contributes to the preservation of the system. (Waltz, 2006: 172-165) 
Thus the Ion I. C Bratianu, Alexandru Averescu and Alexandru 
Marghiloman governments strove as much as possible to preserve the 
existence of the state, its survival. Their ingrate task required them to keep 
close, friendly relations with the Allies, while also resisting pressures exerted 
by Central Powers for the conclusion of the peace. The main goal of the 
German military authorities was to obtain a decisive triumph in the East, to 
seize war material and then to move all the forces in the West. (Gorun, 2010: 
197) 
The Romanian armistice of Focsani (signed on December 9, 1917) has 
to be perceived as a natural and unhappy consequence of the Russian 
armistice, as the Russian and Romanian fronts were closely related. In other 
words, the Romanian front was a part of the Eastern front. If Russia had left 
the war, Romania would not have been able to keep up the front alone, using 
only its army. Since the fall of 1917, the Soviet authorities have intercepted 
and confiscated all war materials and ammunition destined to Romania. 
(Ibidem) 
The relations between Iasi and Petrograd worsened fast, as well. On 
January 13/26, 1918, Sovnarkom broke diplomatic relations with the 
Romanian government and ordered Constantin Diamandi’s (the Romanian 
minister from Petrograd) imprisonment. He was liberated only after the 
protests of Entente’s ambassadors in Russia. (Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires étrangères français, D. 349: 92, 95, 113, 127, 149). 
At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, the Western Allies 
attempted to create a centre of military resistance in South Russia. The 
reorganized Romanian army had to be the piece of resistance in this project. 
The paper shares the point of view of American historian Glenn E. Torrey. He 
categorically stated that the sine qua non condition for the success of this plan 
was the stability of the situation in Bessarabia. This region enjoyed an 
important strategic position. It was situated at the back of the front and housed 
the provisions and weapons storages. But unfortunately, as Ion I. C. Bratianu 
had feared, the turmoil and disorder from Moldavia passed to the territory 
between Prut and Nistru, due to the Russian soldiers marching East (Torrey, 
2014: 289) 
Willing to maintain Romanian belligerency at all costs, Paris, London, 
Rome and Washington rejected any negotiation of peace with the Central 
Powers. The French government, headed by the minister of war, Georges 
Clemenceau urged Romania to continue the resistance until the end and by all 
means. (Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Romaniei, Fund Paris, vol. 
36: 110). In fact, according to diplomatic and military documents I researched, 
Clemenceau was probably the most radical French official. 
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General Berthelot shared a quite similar attitude, despite Romanian 
military difficulties. In his opinion, the Romanian army should continue to 
fight even beyond the Nistru river, not just between Prut and Nistru. However, 
he complained that Russia was unfriendly towards Romania and willing to 
conclude peace with the Central Powers. Moreover, in Bessarabia the lack of 
raw materials was obvious. There was no coal and no oil. (Grandhomme, 
Roucaud, Sarmant, 2000: 347; Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Série 
Conseil Supérieur de Guerre, Carton 4N40, Telegram no. 1165 of General 
Berthelot to the Minister of War, January 3rd 1918; Ibidem, Telegram no. 
1023, December 8th 1917; See also Cipaianu, 1997). 
In the first months of 1918, the French Military Mission’s commander 
did his best to prevent negotiations for peace (See Grandhomme, Roucaud, 
Sarmant, 2000), a behaviour shared by any other diplomatic or military 
representative of the Entente. According to Stephen Pichon, the minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Allies should have reiterated commitments concerning 
Romania, in order to encourage Romanian resistance. (Archives du Ministère 
des Affaires étrangères français, Guerre 1914-1918, Roumanie, D. 349: 204.) 
Of course, the Allies were aware that an armistice represented a prelude for a 
peace treaty. This kind of treaty was to be avoided. For the reasons I expressed 
earlier, they strongly opposed peace negotiations. 
Surely, the plenipotentiary minister, Saint-Aulaire, got better 
acquainted with Romanian realities. He had to respect all the instructions 
received from his government, the same way the other diplomatic agents did. 
Among the Allied powers, France was the most intransigent. The count Saint-
Aulaire complained to Stephen Pichon that he (the French minister in Iasi) had 
the monopoly over the threatening demarches concerning relations with the 
government of Iasi. (Ibidem: 85) Unlike the French ambassador in Rome, 
Camille Barrère, Saint-Aulaire told that Romania’s situation was totally 
different from that of Serbia or Belgium. The Romanian Kingdom was 
completely isolated, but the two countries could go on to communicate with 
Allies. The sending of some Czech divisions on the Romanian front failed. 
(Ibidem, D. 358: 254) 
The Romanian minister in Paris, Victor Antonescu was afraid that if 
Romania disappointed the Allied powers, being unable to carry on the 
struggle, the public opinion in those countries would be badly influenced. 
(Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Romaniei, Fund Paris, vol. 36: 110) 
But this paper does not fully subscribe to this point of view, although the role 
of the public opinion was stressed by a few theories in international relations 
such as liberal idealism. (Guzzini, 2000: 50-45) The foreign policy decision-
makers do not consider the public opinion’s wishes too much. Moreover, 
public opinion from a state could be dominated by different emotions. The 
emotions of the actors should not be seriously taken into consideration when 
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talking about the foreign policy process, as the realist thinker Hans 
Morgenthau emphasized. (Roche, 1999: 32) 
On February 2, 1918, the German General August von Mackensen 
informed Constantin Prezan, the chief of the Romanian General Staff that the 
maintenance of the armistice convention on December 9, 1917, was 
impossible following the new developments. Meanwhile, Romania had broken 
diplomatic relations with Russia and Russian troops had left the Romanian 
front. (Arhivele Ministerului de Externe al României, Fund Paris, vol. 37, 
Telegram sent from Iasi, signed Bratianu, January 31, 1918; Archives du 
Ministère des Affaires étrangères français, Guerre 1914-1918, Roumanie, D. 
358: 306). 
 A new international event happening in the proximity of Romanian 
borders complicated, even more, Romania’s situation. Ukraine, which had 
served as a buffer zone for the Romanian state signed, as well, a separate peace 
with Central Powers, on February 9, 1918. Romania’s situation became 
critical. (Cipaianu, 1993:78) Any effort for a military resistance could mean a 
suicidal act. The lack of ammunition was also obvious. 
The government led by Ion I.C. Bratianu had to resign in favour of the 
cabinet headed by General Alexandru Averescu. The new government tried 
not to break the ties with the Allies. But the president of the Council of 
ministers had to deal with the Central Powers as well. The Romanian 
diplomacy attempted to get the maintenance of all commitments regarding its 
territorial integrity and the new frontiers of the state from the Entente’s 
authorities. (Oprescu, 1979: 161). General Averescu was not able to avoid the 
conclusion of peace with Germany and its allies. (Gorun, 2013: 142). The 
ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and the U.S.A. from Iasi received 
recommendations from their governments to disagree with all negotiations 
between Romania and Central Powers. (Idem, 2009: 289). The negotiations 
between Averescu’s cabinet and the enemy might have concluded, in the 
opinion of Entente’s authorities, with a separate peace. 
 
Conclusion 
The position of Entente’s diplomatic and military circles oscillated. In 
fact, all these states forcibly opposed separate peace. Still, we can see some 
differences between France and Italy on one hand, and Great Britain on the 
other. The French attitude was more clearly defined than the English attitude. 
The instructions received by Saint-Aulaire from Paris were more categorical 
than the recommendations sent from the Foreign Office for George Barclay. 
We can also perceive differences on this topic between the Entente’s 
diplomatic representatives in the Romanian capital and their governments. The 
four ministers in Iasi knew the Romanian realities much better. They all 
proposed a common declaration of the Entente’s countries. Thus, Romania 
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had carried out all its obligations as an allied state and all the actions of the 
enemy taken in the occupied territory should be condemned. The Romanian 
military resistance became impossible due to the lack of ammunition. The new 
government headed by Alexandru Marghiloman tried to keep cordial relations 
with the Entente but it could not avoid the peace treaty with the Central 
Empires. However, the peace treaty signed in Bucharest on April 24/ May 7 
was never promulgated by King Ferdinand. Moreover, Romania joined the 
Entente again and re-entered the war on November 10, 1918, before the end 
of the Great War. 
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